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ABSTRACT
The dissertation studies the value of both investment banks’ services on the whole and
fairness opinions specifically, which the banks provide to the acquiring firms. In the first chapter,
I examine how investment banks and acquiring firms’ governance quality interact to affect
shareholders’ wealth in corporate mergers and acquisitions. Although the wealth impact of
investment banks in mergers and acquisitions is widely studied in the literature, existing studies
do not consider the interaction between governance quality and investment banks. I examine how
investment banks and governance quality of acquiring firms interact to affect the wealth of
acquiring firms’ shareholders. I find that acquiring firms with poor governance are more likely
to use investment banks in the deal. This association holds even after controlling for deal feature
and other characteristics. I find that the use of investment banks per se does not result in a
wealth reduction for the acquiring firms’ shareholders. However, when the acquiring firm has
poor governance, the use of investment bank is associated with extra value loss for the
shareholders. The finding suggests that investment banks may help managerial empire building
at the expense of shareholders under some circumstances. The study indicates that when studying
investment bank’s impact it is important to consider the quality of the hiring firms’ governance.
In the second chapter, I investigate the wealth implications of fairness opinions that the
board of an acquiring firm purchases in corporate mergers from investment banks. Using the
propensity score matching method to address the self-selection issue, I find that firms
undertaking opinioned mergers under-perform firms with non-opinioned matching mergers in
short windows around the announcement date. In the long run, the firms with opinioned merger
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do not perform better than firms with non-opinioned mergers. The acquiring firms perform
poorly relative to their performance before the mergers, irrespective of whether their mergers are
opinioned. Over a 12-month window after the mergers, the acquiring firms involved in both
opinioned and non-opinioned mergers under-perform matching firms that do not make mergers.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the board buys a fairness opinion for its
self-protection instead of maximization of shareholder wealth. The implication of this finding is
that when investors evaluate mergers, they should focus primarily on deal characteristics, not
fairness opinion.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Both academics and practitioners are interested in the value change of the firms involving
in corporate mergers and acquisitions and try to understand the factors that are associated with
such change, if any. In the nature, this dissertation is an addition to the literature exploring the
similar topic. However, different from prior studies, the dissertation addresses the gap in the
literature and examines a new issue that has never been explored, to the best of my knowledge.
Specifically, in the fist chapter, I study how investment banks hired by the acquiring firm interact
with the quality of acquiring firm’s governance to affect the wealth of acquiring firms’
shareholders around the deal announcement. It examines the dual-agent issue under the general
framework of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is a new perspective to
investigate the value of investment banks’ services in corporate mergers and acquisitions.
In the second chapter, I investigate the wealth implications of fairness opinions that the
board of an acquiring firm purchases in a corporate merger from investment banks regarding
whether the deal is fair to their shareholders. Using the propensity score matching method to
address the self-selection issue, I find that firms undertaking opinioned mergers under-perform
firms with non-opinioned matching mergers in short windows around the announcement date. In
the long run, the firms with opinioned mergers do not perform better than non-opinioned
matching mergers. These findings support the hypothesis that the board buys a fairness opinion
for its self-protection instead of maximization of shareholder wealth. The implication of the
findings is that when investors evaluate mergers, they should focus primarily on deal
characteristics, not fairness opinions.
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CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND THE WEALTH
EFFECT OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN CORPORATE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS
2.1. Introduction
Investment banks perform many important functions within the economy including
underwriting securities, providing venture capital, conducting capital market research, assisting
complex transactions, and facilitating mergers and acquisitions. Theoretical models show that the
general functions of financial institutions include reducing transaction costs (Benston and Smith,
1976), alleviating asymmetric information in imperfect markets (Leland and Pyle, 1976), and
simultaneously producing information and providing other services (Campbell and Kracaw,
1980). Consistent with these theoretical models, empirical studies document the positive
contributions of investment banks in several functional areas such as underwriting and venture
capitalism.
Despite the positive contributions that investment banks provide in the economy, recent
events, such as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, have brought increased scrutiny to the
investment banking community. A recent statement by the General Accounting Office (GAO) is
emblematic of the criticism that has been leveled at investment banks. In 2003, the GAO stated
“certain investment banks facilitated and participated in complex financial transactions with
Enron despite allegedly knowing that the intent of the transaction was to manipulate and obscure
Enron’s true financial condition.” Further, the Wall Street Fine Tracker reported that Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $80
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million, $101 million, $135 million and $80 million fine respectively for Enron-related
allegations, without admitting or denying guilt.1
Although it remains unclear whether investment banks engaged in illegal behaviors in the
collapse of Enron, there is little doubt that it was the managers of Enron who hired these banks in
the first place. Similarly in corporate mergers and acquisitions, it is the managers, not the
shareholders, who decide whether to hire an investment bank, which investment bank should be
hired, and what goals need to be accomplished by the investment bank.

Thus, the motives of

these managers may affect the way the bank fulfills its assignments.
Of course, investment banks may work independently out of the reputation concerns. In
order to maintain or increase market share, the banks need to protect their reputation, since the
market for their service is competitive. Indeed, reputation is one reason that initial public
offering (IPO) firms switch underwriters in their follow-up seasonal equity offerings (SEOs)
(Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001). Probably also because of reputation concerns, prestigious
underwriters are associated with good quality IPOs (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter, Dark and
Singh, 1998). Nonetheless, since acquiring firms do not have to use investment banks in mergers
and acquisitions and their managers have great discretion in use of investment bank, the decision
to hire an investment bank is management-dominated. In this case, the quality of the firm’s
governance must be considered when investigating the wealth impact of investment banks.
In this study, I investigate the wealth effect of the use of investment banks in a sample of
mergers and acquisitions occurring between 1992 and 2004. Recognizing that the decision to use
an investment bank in the first place is a managerial decision, and that the quality of managerial
1

http://www.forbes.com/2002/10/24/cx_aw_1024fine.html (Wall Street Fine tracker,

07.28.04)

3

decisions is impacted by the firm’s governance quality, I control for the impact of governance
quality on the wealth effects. More specifically, I provide answers to the following relevant
questions: does the quality of governance in the acquiring firm influence the decision to use an
investment bank in the mergers and acquisitions? Does the use of investment bank in the
transaction have a wealth effect for the acquiring firm’s shareholders?
I find that the poor governance in acquiring firms is positively associated with use of
investment banks in mergers and acquisitions. This relation holds beyond deal features and firm
characteristics such as transaction size, method of payment, type of transaction, and firm
performance. I find that when the acquiring firms have poor governance, the use of investment
banks is associated with a significant wealth loss for their shareholders. In contrast, when the
acquiring firms’ governance quality is good, the use of investment banks is not associated with
significant losses. The findings suggest that investment banks may help managerial empire
building at the expense of shareholders when they facilitate transactions among poorly governed
acquiring firms.
The study makes two important contributions to the extant literature. First, I find that
corporate governance is one of important determinants of the use of investment banks. Servaes
and Zenner (1996) find that investment banks are more likely to be used in complex deals. I find
that besides the complexity of that transaction (Servaes and Zenner, 1996), the quality of
corporate governance is an important determinant of the decision to use an investment bank in
the first place. Second, it increases our understanding of the value consequence of using
investment banks and shows whether or not investment banks add value is affected by the
acquiring firm’s governance quality. Extant works investigate the wealth effect of investment
banks in corporate mergers and acquisitions from several different respects. Servaes and Zenner

4

(1996) look at the deal feature; Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) compare the relative reputation
between bidder’s and target’s advisors; Rau (2000) and Hunter et al. (2003) contrast the topversus low-tiers banks; Rau (2000) and McLanghlin (1990) also focus on the contingent nature
of the fee structure between investment banks and acquiring firms. All of these prior studies do
not consider the quality of the hiring firm’s governance. I consider the omission in this study. I
find that when the acquiring firms have good governance in place, investment banks are not
associated with extra value reduction. But when the governance in the acquiring firm is poor,
investment banks are associated with extra value reduction. This reminds us that investment
banks, hired by the managers, are the agent of agents, and their job quality may be affected by
the extent to which managers in the acquiring firm maximize their shareholders’ wealth. This
finding compliments extant literature on the wealth effect of investment banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops the hypotheses,
Section 2.3 discusses the data and methodology, Section 2.4 presents empirical results and
Section 2.5 provides concluding remarks for the chapter.

2.2. Literature review and theoretic predictions
Investment banks provide a variety of services in M&As. For example, they may help
with pricing, or help acquiring firms optimize accounting, tax and legal treatment. They may
also provide financing for the deals (Stouraitis, 2003). The banks often initiate deals, emerging
as the “principal architects” of business combinations (Bowers and Miller, 1990).2
Despite the variety of services investment banks provides in the M&As, the literature
remains mixed regarding the wealth impact of the banks. Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that use
2

In order to be consistent with existing literature, I do not differentiate specific functions performed by investment
banks in this study, and I also ignore how many banks acquiring firms use and when the banks enter and leave the
deal. As long as acquiring firms use investment banks, or financial advisors as generally called, in their deal, I say
that investment bank is used.
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of investment banks is not associated with wealth enhancement for the acquiring firms. Kale,
Kini and Ryan (2003) document that the relative reputation between the bidder’s and target’s
advisors helps increase the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth
gain accruing to the bidder. Bowers and Miller (1990) find that in acquisitions where either the
bidding or target firm uses first-tier investment bankers, the total incremental wealth is greater
than when neither firm employs a prestigious banker. Rau (2000) and Hunter et al. (2003) show
that top-tier investment banks are associated with greater wealth loss for acquiring firms than
lower-tier investment banks. Rau (2000) points out that the investment banks may push the deals
to completion in pursuit of advising fees. These studies examine the impact of investment banks
in different scenarios, but the governance quality of acquiring firms is not explored. The
following sections focus on this issue, linking the governance and use of investment banks.

2.2.1. Governance quality, agency problem, and use of investment banks
The separation between ownership and management allows managers to maximize their
interests at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managerial empire
building is one typical example of the managerial agency problem, a well documented theory for
merger motives in the literature (see Trautwein, 1990). Under this theory, managers benefit from
firms’ expansion. Using a bank sample, Bliss and Rosen (2001) show that Chief Executive
Officers’ (CEOs’) compensation typically increases after mergers even if the acquirer’s stock
price declines. CEOs often get direct cash bonuses for successful completion of M&A deals.3
The bonuses increased as the CEO’s power and influence on board increased (Grinstein and
Hribar, 2004). Through acquisition of assets in different sectors, CEOs can also diversify the risk
associated with their human capital. CEOs can also increase their prestige and standing in the
3

For instance, Exxon, HealthSouth, Bankers’ Trust, and Travelers Group recently paid their CEOs cash bonuses of
$5 million to $14 million dollars for successfully completing the acquisitions (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).
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business community by pursuing acquisitions (Avery, Chevalier and Schaefer, 1998). Overall,
both direct financial compensation and non-financial benefits associated with the larger firm give
CEOs strong incentives for expansion, regardless the interest of shareholders.
When the quality of corporate governance is good, managerial agency issue may be less
serious. With good governance, managers are more easily disciplined. Consequently, the
managers in strong governance firms are less likely to enter the value-destroying deals for their
shareholders. For instance, they may enter fewer deals (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) or
choose to enter less complex deals. Complex deals are not in the interest of shareholder (Servaes
et al., 1996). Also under good governance, the firm may have strong control over the quality of
investment project. The board directors may more effectively screen merger proposals and reject
those that are not in the interest of shareholders. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2006) find that good
governance firms lose less during their merger announcements. If the deal is relatively simple, or
fundamentally sound in the nature, it may be more easily executed at least on the buy side, and
this makes the use of investment bank less necessary, since investment banks are likely to be
used in the complex deals (Servaes et al. 1996) and they have skill to push complex deals to
completion (Rau, 2000).
However, it is also possible that the board of directors under the good governance try to
maximize the interest of shareholders and hire the investment banks to facilitate the deals.
Investment banks hold information on a large number of firms, and are able to identify a target
firm at low search cost. They have expertise determining the price, and smoothing the
negotiations. All of these functions probably serve the interest of shareholders. In this sense, it is
possible that good governance is positively associated with use of investment banks. Overall, the
impact of good governance on use of investment bank is an empirical question.
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When the quality of corporate governance is poor, the board of directors may not be
effective in restraining managerial empire building. Gaughan (2004) notes that, “there are too
few examples of a board standing up to a CEO’s empire-building schemes,”4 possibly because
they are indebted to CEOs or they also benefit from the expansion. Either way, directors and
executive are allied together to some extent.5

6

In this context, bad acquisitions driven by

managerial objectives take place (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), and the market reacts more
negatively to such acquisitions (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2006). Deals with poor market reactions
may confront tough resistance from shareholders and may be more difficult to go through. In
order to push such deal to completion and achieve their own interest, managers with serious
agency problems may be more likely to use investment banks, since banks have skills to
facilitate the deal completion (Rau, 2000).
However, if the investment banks work independently and have a concern of reputation,
it may refuse to advise the deals that lack the synergy or potentially reduce the shareholders’
wealth. But the existing literature seemingly suggests pursuing advising fee is a priority for
investment banks (see Rau, 2000; McLanghlin, 1990). When top-tier banks are used, acquiring
firms’ shareholders lose even more.7
Admittedly, using M&A opportunity to have association with investment banks is
desirable to managers personally in the firms with both good and bad governance. Managers may
receive personal benefit for granting business to investment banks. For instance, they may get

4

A notable exception was that the board of Coca-cola rejected the takeover proposal for Quaker Oats in November
2001 (Gaughan, 2004).
5
Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2002) find a significant positive relation between CEO and director compensation after
controlling for monitoring proxies.
6
Based on this argument, I refer to managers as comprising both executives and directors for the remainder of the
paper, as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).
7
Kale et al. (2003) do find that acquiring firms are more likely to withdraw the deal that is not in the interest of
shareholders when using banks. But that is different issue from what we discuss here about the use of investment
banks in the first place.
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allocation of IPOs underwritten by these investment banks (Tucker and Bierne, 2004).8 However,
the use of investment banks is costly. Millions of dollars go to investment banks as advisory
fees.9 Managers in the firm with poor governance may have more freedom to consume excessive
perquisite and easily expense these fees without the concern being disciplined (see Shleifer and
Vishny, 1989). Managers in the poor governance firms may be powerful and entrench
themselves well. Powerful managers are able to shape their compensation arrangement (see
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002).
Given the analyses above, I expect the poor governance to be positively associated with
the use of investment banks, although when the governance is good, the relation is less clear.
Given the possible private benefits for the managers, this relation may exist beyond the deal
features. I test this hypothesis empirically in this paper.

2.2.2. Wealth effects and the interaction of governance quality and use of
investment banks
Investment banks are hired by the acquiring firms’ managers. These managers are the
agents of their shareholders. Hired by these agents, investment banks in turn are agents’ agents.
The banks’ performance is affected by the standards set by the hiring managers and by how the
managers and the banks interact. If the managers do not put the interests of shareholders as
priority, it is hard to expect the banks to do so. Furthermore, investment banks are compensated
for the successful closure of a deal, not for the deal’s performance. The majority of the fee
income for investment banks is contingent on the deal completion, and the fee is increasing in
the value of deals. McLaughlin (1990) finds that over 80% of the fee in an average contract is
8

Piper Jaffray (nyse: PJC - news - people ) was fined $2.4 million and censured by NASD for allegations related to
the allocation of initial public offerings from 1999 to 2001. In agreeing to the penalty, Piper Jaffray neither admitted
nor denied the charges. NASD alleged that Piper Jaffray investment bankers developed a tiered system for awarding
IPO shares to the executives of corporate clients. A "0" ranking, according to NASD, meant "no stock for you."
9
The mean value is 2.34 million with standard deviation 5.7 million according to Hunter and Jagtiani (2003).
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paid only if the acquisition is complete. Under this contingent contract, investment banks may
pursue the deal completion by all means and only perform the duties specified in the contract.
This may be particularly true when the acquiring firms have poor governance and their managers
undertake empire building. In this case, the involvement of investment banks may potentially
hurt shareholders since it pushes the completion of deals that may lack synergy.
When the acquiring firms have good governance in place, their managers may emphasize
the interest of shareholders when interacting with investment banks. The interacting process may
provide investment banks with explicit or implicit wealth requirements besides the completion of
deals. The managers in the acquiring firms with good governance may reject the bank’s solution
proposals during the advising process if they think the proposals are not in the best interest of
shareholders. The rejection may force the investment banks to develop other alternatives, which
serve the interest of shareholders better.
However, if strong monitoring is lacking investment banks may more focus on deal
completion due to the contingent nature of the compensation structure. The interaction process
between managers under poor governance and investment banks reinforce the importance of
completing the deals, and signal no or weak requirement to maximize shareholders’ wealth. For
the fee reason, investment banks may apply their skills to complete the deals by all means.
However, when the governance quality is good in the acquiring firms, the investment banks may
focus on shareholders’ interests more than the deal completion due to the monitoring from the
managers. Therefore, I expect that investment banks may be associated with shareholders’ value
losses when interacting with acquiring firms with poor governance.

10

2.3. Methodology
The data collection starts from the Governance Index dataset created by Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003). The index has values for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002.
For each year in which the GI data are available (GI year), I retrieve the financial data from
Compustat for all firms (GI firms) in each GI year and the years subsequent to each GI year until
the next GI year. For example, for the firms with governance index in the year 1990, I download
the financial data for the year 1990, 1991 and 1992. The governance index for each GI firm in
year 1991 and 1992 has the same value as in 1990. By obtaining financial information from
Compustat, I have 19,755 observations. Then, for each firm with financial data, I obtain the
merger and acquisitions from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) during the sample period
ranging from 1992 to 2004. These deals take the form of mergers, acquisitions of main interest,
acquisition of partial interest, acquisitions of remaining interest, and acquisitions of assets. This
results in 18,949 observations. I merge the deals with acquiring firms’ previous year’s financial
information. This produces 10,900 observations. For these deals, I use standard event study
methodology to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns based on acquiring firms’ cusip and
announcement date; this results in 10,676 observations for the wealth analyses.
The GI is the total number of firms’ anti-takeover provisions adopted by a given firm,
ranging from 1 to 24. Among these provisions, the most popular are those that stagger the terms
of directors, provide severance package for managers, and limit shareholders’ ability to act.
Gompers et al. (2003) use governance index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. They
find that firms with higher governance indices, that is, managers with strong right, have lower
firm value, lower sales growth, higher capital expenditures, and make more acquisitions.
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Complementing Gompers et al. (2003), Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) find that firms with high
governance indices exhibit significant future operating underperformance. DeAngelo and Rice
(1983) and Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) document managerial entrenchment motivates the
adoption of anti-takeover amendments. More recently, Masulis et al (2006) show acquiring firms
with higher governance index lose more in their merger and acquisition announcement. They
argue that this may be driven by empire building of managers who are subject to the weak
monitoring from corporate control market. Fahlenbrach (2003) examines the relationship
between shareholder rights (measured by GI) and the compensation contracts of executives, and
find that non-founder-CEOs receive higher total compensation, a higher annual increase in
compensation, and have smaller fractional ownership if the managers have more power relative
to shareholders. All of these studies above consistently and strongly evidence that firms with
higher governance index have greater agency costs.10 Thus, in this study, I use governance index
to proxy for the quality of corporate governance. A high value of the index indicates poor
governance.

2.3.1. Governance quality and the decision to use investment banks
I first examine whether governance quality in the acquiring firms is associated with use
of investment banks, with the occurrence of the deal as given. For each deal, SDC records
whether a financial advisor is used by target firms and acquiring firms, how many advisors each
side uses, and identifies the advisor by name if any. In this study, I do not analyze the structure
of financial advisors. As long as SDC discloses a financial advisor is used by the acquiring firm,
I code the dummy variable “IB” with value of 1 and 0 otherwise.

10

Also see the discussion on page 2 of Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006).
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In order to test the relation between governance quality and the likelihood of using an
investment bank, I set up the following logistic choice model:
Prob( IB) = α + β 1 * GI + ∑ β i * Controls i + ε 1

(2.1)

where IB is a binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm uses investment banks and 0
otherwise; GI is the governance index for the acquiring firm from Gompers et al. (2003) for the
year in which the deal is announced or one or two years preceding the announcement year;
Control variables includes TotalAsset, NetIncome and many others. TotalAsset is the total asset
of firms in the governance index dataset (in millions of dollars); NetIncome is the net income of
the acquiring firm (in millions of dollars); Other control variables include announcement years
and deal features including transaction size, method of payment, whether acquiring firms and
target firms share the same three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, the attitude of
target managers, and the type of deal.
The focus of model (2.1) is to test the coefficient β1. Since high GI value is proxy for
poor governance, a positive and significant β1 means the acquiring firms with poor governance is
more likely to use an investment bank. A negative and significant β1 indicates that the acquiring
firm with poor governance is less likely to use an investment bank.

2.3.2. Wealth effects of use of investment banks
I use the abnormal returns around merger announcements to capture the wealth effects.
Abnormal returns are computed using the standard event study approach. The estimation period
is the 255-day period ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. The equally weighted
index of stocks traded on the New York and American Stock Exchanges is from the CRSP.
Following Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001), I compute two-day (-1, 0) cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) for acquirers in response to merger announcements. For the purpose of
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robustness check, I also report the test results using the window (-1, 1). I report CARs for all
acquirers as a whole and for subgroups of acquirers based on whether an investment bank is used
in the deal.
I use the following regression model to investigate the wealth effect of governance
quality, the use of the investment bank, and the interaction between the two variables:
CAR = α + β1 * GI + β 2 * IB + β 3 * GI * IB + ∑ β i * Controlsi + ε 2

(2.2)

where CAR is cumulative abnormal return over (-1, 0) or (-1, 1) window; and the other variables
are as defined in equation (1). Our main interest is to test whether the coefficient on the
interaction between governance quality and use of investment banks is statistically significant.
The IB in equation (2.2) is a choice variable. If some variables in the error term of
equation also affect acquiring firms’ decision to use investment banks, IB will be correlated with
the error term, and the OLS estimate of βs will be biased. Given this consideration, I use
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure to control for endogeneity as Campa and Kedia (2002)
addressing the self-selection issue in firm diversification. Following Campa and Kedia (2002), I
first estimate equation (2.1) using a probit model, calculated λ1, λ2 and λ, and insert λ into
equation (2.2) to control for the endogeneity. 11

2.4. Empirical testing results
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics for the sample
The descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 2.1.

11

As Campa and Kedia (2002), I also assume that the errors in equation (1) and (2) have a bivariate normal

distribution. If we present the equation (2.1) in the format of IB =
*

IB * < 0 , then. λ1 is

φ (β * Z )
Φ( β * Z )

, λ2 is

β * Z + ε , IB = 1 if IB* > 0 , IB = 0

− φ (β * Z )
, and λ = λ1 * IB + λ 2 * (1 − IB ) .
1 − Φ( β * Z )
14

if

Panel A in Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms. The average governance
index for acquiring firms is 9.25, with a standard deviation of 2.76. Acquiring firm’s average is
$11,034 million in assets. The average return on asset (ROA) for acquiring firms is 4.36%.
Panel B in Table 2.1 presents the deal features in several respects. According to this
panel, in approximately 19% of deals acquiring firms use investment banks ( the mean of the
variable ‘IB’ is 0.19); on average, approximately 13 % of the deal value is financed with
acquiring firms’ stocks (the mean of the variable ‘stockpay’ is 0.13); acquiring firm and target
firm share the first three digits of their SIC codes in about 39% of deals (the mean of variable
‘Industry’ is 39%); in terms of the managerial attitude, about 0.5% of deals are not welcome by
target firm managers (the variable ‘attitude’ has mean of 0.005); based on SDC classifications,
approximately 24.6 percent of the sample are outright mergers, 2.0 percent are acquisitions of
major interest, 9.5 percent are acquisitions of partial interest, 2.2 percent are acquisitions of
remaining interest and 61.5 percent are asset acquisitions.
In order to test the impact of governance quality, I group the observations into five equal
groups based on the governance index value. Quintile 1 is the group in which the acquiring firms
have lowest average governance index and the quintile 5 is the group in which the acquiring
firms have the highest mean value of governance index. The high GI value is the proxy for poor
governance. The minimum and maximum values of GI for each group are given in the bracket.

2.4.2. Preliminary tests of the hypotheses
Table 2.2 includes three panels. The Panel A presents the comparison of different type of
deals. We can see that investment bank is more used in the merger deals and less likely to be
used in acquisitions of partial interest (6.3%) and acquisitions of asset (11.3%). The means of
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CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-1, 1) over different type of deals show that acquiring firms lose more in
merger deals and have significant gain in acquisitions of partial interest and asset acquisitions.
The negative cumulative abnormal return around the merger announcement is consistent with
Datta et al. (2003). The results are in line with the review in Jensen and Ruback (1983).
Panel B in Table 2.2 shows the use of investment bank increases as the governance
quality decreases. When the acquiring firms have lowest mean of GI, the percentage of deals that
use investment bank is 16.5 % and this percentage increases to 19.7 % when firms have highest
average GI. The three higher GI quintiles seem to have higher percentage of using investment
banks than two lower GI quintiles. Panel B shows that it seems that firms with higher GI (poor
governance) are more likely to use investment banks.
Panels C1 and C2 show the market reaction to the deal announcement and present the
preliminary results of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The average 2- and 3-day CARs
for acquiring firms are -0.01% and 0.06% respectively, both statistically insignificant. However,
when examining the results based on whether or not the acquiring firm uses investment banks,
interesting results emerge.

Using the CAR (-1, 0) to illustrate, the deals that do not use

investment banks have average CAR (-1, 0) of 0.09%, significant at the 5% level. The deals that
do use investment banks have an average CAR (-1, 0) of -0.42%, significant at the 1% level.
The negative association between participation of investment banks and market reaction may be
due to the fact that investment banks are more often used in complex deals (Servaes et al., 1996).
Due to the lack of controls, we cannot filter out the marginal contribution of investment banks in
the deals.
The average values of both CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-1, 1) over five GI groups seemingly
show the negative association between market reaction and the governance quality of the
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acquiring firms. The average two-day abnormal return CAR (0, 1) is 0.04% for the group which
has lowest average GI (good governance), and -0.04% for the acquiring firms with highest
average GI (poor governance). The negative association between governance quality and market
reaction is consistent with findings in Masulis et al. (2006).
Examining the wealth effect of the interaction between investment bank and governance
quality, it is seemingly easy to identify a pattern. Again using CAR (-1, 0) to illustrate, we can
see that the negative relation between governance and market reaction is strong when investment
banks are used. When investment bank is present, the group with lowest governance index (good
governance) has the two-day abnormal returns of -0.28% and the group with highest governance
index has -0.40%. When the investment banks are not present, the negative association between
governance quality and market reaction seemingly is not strong, particularly if we look at the
CAR (-1, 1).
To test the existence of the interaction effects, I conduct two-factor analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The results are reported in the last column of Panels C1 and C2 in Table 2.2. Still
using CAR (-1, 0) to illustrate, the first F-test with value of 23.82 is testing the main effect of the
use of investment banks. It has p-value smaller than 0.01%, indicating that the involvement of
investment banks has a significant impact on the market reactions. The significance of the F-test
on the main effect of governance quality confirms that governance quality is reflected in the
market reaction. The F-test on the interaction between the investment banks and governance
quality is significant at the 5% level, indicating that the banks and quality of governance work
together and have extra impact on the market reaction. The ANOVA using CAR (-1, 1) presents
similar results except that the interaction effect is not significant at the traditional significance
level. These results of the univariate tests indicate that the quality of governance and investment
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banks seemingly have an interaction impact on shareholders’ wealth around the deal
announcements.

2.4.3. Multivariate tests
2.4.3.1. Governance quality and the choice to use investment banks
Table 2.3 presents the results of the logistic model identifying the factors influencing the
decision to use an investment bank. The model (1) regresses the likelihood of using the bank on
governance quality, only controlling for firm feature, years, and the percentage of previous 20
deals using investment banks, which is included to capture the possible clustering pattern in use
of financial advisors. Models (2) controls for deal features such at the natural logarithm of total
asset, return on asset (ROA), relative size of transaction defined as transaction value divided by
acquiring firm’s total asset. Models (1) and (2) use the same samples, but they have different
model specifications.
The results in Model (1) show that the governance index is positively associated with the
decision to use an investment bank. The coefficient estimate on GI is 0.0199 significant at the 5
percent level. Stronger results are reported for Models (2). The coefficient becomes 0.0306,
significant at 1% level, indicating acquiring firms with poor governance quality are more likely
to use investment banks in their mergers and acquisitions.
Table 2.3 also presents other variables that significantly affect the firm’s choice to use
investment bank. The relative size of the transaction and the form of merger, partial interest
acquisition and remaining interest acquisition significantly associate with the likelihood of using
investment banks. ‘Merger’, ‘major’, ‘partial’, and ‘remaining’ are all dummy variables and
compared with the base deals-acquisitions of asset. The positive coefficient on ‘merger’ of
0.5274 indicates that investment banks are more often used in merger deals than asset deals. The
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negative coefficient on ‘partial’ shows that investment banks are less often involved in the deals
of acquisition of partial interest than acquisitions of asset.
2.4.3.2. Use of investment banks and their impact on the acquirers
Table 2.4 reports the results of poor data regressions with correction of heteroscedacity in
error items. Models (1), (2), and (3) use CAR (-1, 0) as the dependent variable. Models (4), (5),
and (6) use CAR (-1, 1). Model (1) includes both GI and the use of investment bank (IB), but
excludes their interaction term. Model (1) only controls for firm characteristics. Model (2)
includes the interaction term (GI*IB) as well as the individual term IB and GI, controlling for
both firm characteristics and deal features. Model (3) controls for endogeneity issue.
The coefficient estimate on IB in Model (1) is -0.0052, significant at 1% level. The
model does not control for deal features or the interaction term between governance quality and
the use of investment banks. When the model includes the interaction item as Model (2), the
significance of the coefficient on use of investment banks (IB) disappears, whereas the
coefficient on the interaction term is -0.0008, statistically significant at the 10 percent level when
controlling for endogeneity, as showed in model (3). These results also hold over CAR (-1, 1)
no matter whether or not controlling for endogeneity, as models (6) and (7) indicate. The
significance of the coefficient of the interaction term provides the support for the interaction
effect of governance quality and use of investment banks: when investment banks are used by
acquiring firms with poor governance, shareholders lose more.

The results confirm the

prediction that the banks may mainly serve the purposes of managers instead of shareholders’.
The main effect of investment banks is non-negative, which indicates that use of investment
banks, per se, is not associated with value reduction for shareholders, consistent with previous
studies (Servaes et al, 1996). In the models (3) and (6) controlling for endogeneity, the
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coefficients are highly significant, showing the investment banks actually add value when
working independently. This may be due to the skills investment banks have and their concern
for reputation. According to Table 2.4, relative size, use of the stock as currency and the form of
deal as merger are all negatively associated with the wealth effects.
The results in both Tables (2.4) confirm the interaction effect of governance quality and
the use of investment banks on shareholders’ wealth in corporate mergers and acquisitions. If the
managers in the acquiring firms are not maximizing shareholders’ wealth, investment banks, as
contractors hired by these managers, will have even less incentive to do so.

2.5. Conclusions
In this study, I investigate the wealth impact of the use of investment banks in a sample
of corporate mergers and acquisitions occurring between 1992 and 2004. Recognizing that the
decision to use an investment bank in the first place is a managerial decision, and that the quality
of managerial decisions is impacted by the firm’s governance quality, I investigate the impact of
governance quality on the use of investment banks in the acquiring firms and how the
governance quality and the banks interact to affect the acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth.
I find that the poor governance in acquiring firms is positively associated with use of
investment banks in mergers and acquisitions. This relation holds beyond deal features and firm
characteristics such as transaction size, method of payment, type of transaction, and firm
performance. Confirming the existence of interaction effect of governance quality and the use of
investment banks, I find that when the acquiring firm has poor governance, the use of investment
bank is associated with a significant wealth loss for the shareholders. In contrast, when the
acquiring firm’s governance quality is good, the use of investment banks is not associated with
significant losses for the acquiring firm. The findings suggest that investment banks may help
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managerial empire building at the expense of shareholders when they facilitate transactions
among poorly governed acquiring firms.
This study shows that when we consider the wealth effect of investment banks in mergers
and acquisitions, we need to control for the governance quality of acquiring firms. Whether the
agents in the acquiring firms have incentive to maximize their shareholders’ wealth directly
affects the extent to which investment banks add value for the same shareholders. Thus, all of the
results together point to a fundamental issue: it is crucial to strength the quality of corporate
governance, since it may be source of many others’ wrongdoings.
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2.6. Tables for chapter two
Table 2. 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: firm features
Variables
Observation

Mean

GI
10767
TotalAssets
10735
Ln(Total Assets)
10735
ROA
10735
NetIncome
10735
Panel B: deal features
Variables
Observation

Mean

IB
Tranvalue
Relative size
Stockpay
Industry
Attitude
Merger
Major
Partial
Remaining
Asset
Per20

0.19
544.49
0.13
0.135
0.395
0.005
0.247
0.020
0.095
0.022
0.614
0.166

10767
5391
5378
10767
10767
10767
10767
10767
10767
10767
10767
10767

9.26
15965
8.064
0.0436
442.66

Standard
Deviation
2.77
60550
1.6968
0.1321
1627.03

GI-Q1
[1,6]
5.21
20411
7.88
0.04
586

GI-Q2
[7,8]
7.56
22467
7.86
0.03
373

GI-Q3
[9,9]
9.00
10707
7.97
0.04
321

GI-Q4
[10,11]
10.52
12470
8.21
0.05
579

GI-Q5
[12,18]
12.96
12174
8.29
0.04
309

Standard
Deviation
0.39
2735.38
0.39
0.327
0.488
0.076
0.431
0.140
0.293
0.147
0.486
0.089

GI-Q1
[1,6]
0.16
584
0.15
0.14
0.42
0.002
0.250
0.022
0.110
0.020
0.595
0.163

GI-Q2
[7,8]
0.18
537
0.16
0.13
0.43
0.005
0.233
0.021
0.100
0.019
0.624
0.169

GI-Q3
[9,9]
0.20
456.25
0.11
0.15
0.39
0.010
0.285
0.019
0.069
0.029
0.596
0.159

GI-Q4
[10,11]
0.20
462.66
0.11
0.13
0.38
0.003
0.233
0.021
0.100
0.024
0.962
0.168

GI-Q5
[12,18]
0.19
649.91
0.12
0.13
0.36
0.008
0.249
0.018
0.086
0.0203
0.625
0.168

This table shows descriptive statistics for the dataset in the study. Panel A shows the firm features for all the firms in
the dataset. Panel B presents the deal features.
GI is the governance index for the acquiring firm as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), and it may be the exactly
one year before the deal announcement year or at most two year preceding deal announcement year; TotalAsset is
the total asset of firms in the governance index dataset (in millions of dollars); NetIncome is net income of the
acquiring firm (in millions of dollars); ROA is firms’
IB is a binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm uses investment banks and 0 otherwise; Tranvalue is the deal
value of transaction conducted by the acquiring firm; Relative size is the transaction value divided by acquiring
firm’s total asset; Stockpay is the percentage of deal value that is paid with acquiring firm stocks; Industry is a
dummy variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same industry or diversification across
different industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring firm and target firm share first
three digits of their main SIC, and 0 otherwise; Attitude is dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm opposes the
deal and 0 otherwise; Merger is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the deal is merger and 0 otherwise. Major
is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring major interest in the target firm and 0 otherwise.
Partial is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring partial interest in the target firm and 0
otherwise. Remaining is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring remaining interest in the
target firm and 0 otherwise. Asset is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring asset from the
target firm and 0 otherwise; Per20 is the percentage of acquisitions that use investment banks in the twenty
acquisitions preceding the one specific acquisition.
Based the GI value, the sample is divided into five quintile groups. The value in the bracket is the minimum and
maximum GI value for each quintile. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

22

Table 2. 2: Market reaction to the deal announcements
Panel A
Deal
Type

Obs.

%
use of bank

Merger

2666

42.5

Major

218

16.7

Partial

1027

6.3

Remaining

236

28.3

Asset

6620

11.3

Total

10767
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Panel B
Variables
Observations
Use Investment bank
(%)

Obs.
10900
2074
(19.02%)

CAR(-1,0)
Mean
(Std. Error)
-0.0054***
(0.0008)
0.0030
(0.0028)
0.0026**
(0.0011)
0.0035
(0.0029)
0.0013***
(0.0004)
-0.0001
(0.0003)

GI-Q1
[1,6]
1969
326
(16.5%)

CAR(-1,1)
Mean
(Std. Error.)
-0.0057***
(0.0010)
0.0096**
(0.0038)
0.0025*
(0.0014)
0.0050
(0.0034)
0.0025***
(0.0005)
0.0006
(0.0004)

GI-Q2
[7,8]
2496
453
(18.1%)

GI-Q3
[9,9]
1346
277
(20.5%)
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GI-Q4
[10,11]
2577
523
(20.2%)

GI-Q5
[12,18]
2512
495
(19.7%)

Panel C1
Variables

Obs

CAR(-1,0)

10767

No IB
IB

8706
(80.9%)
2061
(19.1%)

-Difference
Panel C2
Variables

Obs.

CAR(-1,1)

10767

No IB
IB
-Difference

8706
(80.9%)
2061
(19.1%)

Mean
(Std. Error.)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0009**
(0.0003)
-0.0042***
(0.0011)
0.0051***
(0.0009)

GI-Q1
[1,6]
0.0004
(0.0010)
0.0010
(0.0010)
-0.0028
(0.0031)

GI-Q2
[7,8]
0.0002
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.0008)
-0.0004
(0.0025)

GI-Q3
[9,9]
0.0009
(0.0010)
0.0017
(0.0010)
-0.0021
(0.0027)

GI-Q4
[10,11]
-0.0011
(0.0007)
0.0008
(0.0007)
-0.0080***
(0.0020)

GI-Q5
[12,18]
-0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0007
(0.0006)
-0.0040**
(0.0021)

F-tests
(ANOVA by GLM)
IB
23.82***
(<0.001)
GI
2.63**
(0.03)
IB*GI 2.63**
(0.03)

Mean
(Std. Error.)
0.0006
(0.0004)
0.0016***
(0.0004)
-0.0033**
(0.0014)
0.0050***
(0.0012)

GI-Q1
[1,6]
0.0008
(0.0012)
0.0011
(0.0012)
-0.0005
(0.0044)

GI-Q2
[7,8]
0.0008
(0.0010)
0.0011
(0.0011)
-0.0004
(0.0031)

GI-Q3
[9,9]
0.0024*
(0.0012)
0.0033
(0.0013)
-0.0010
(0.0035)

GI-Q4
[10,11]
-0.0005
(0.0009)
0.0013
(0.0009)
-0.0081***
(0.0025)

GI-Q5
[12,18]
0.0006
(0.0008)
0.0018**
(0.0008)
-0.0042*
(0.0025)

F-tests
(ANOVA by GLM)
IB
14.11***
(0.00)
GI
1.89*
(0.10)
IB*GI 1.69
(0.14)

The table presents the use of investment banks and CAR over different groups. CAR (-1, 0) is two day cumulative abnormal return base on standard event study.
CAR (-1, 1) is three day cumulative abnormal return. “No IB” includes the deals in which the acquiring firm does not use investment bank. Use IB includes the
deals in which the acquiring firms use investment bank.
Panel A presents the percentage of the deals that use investment banks and market reactions to different type of deals.
In panel B and C, the sample is divided into five quintile groups based on GI value. The numbers in the bracket under GI-Qs are the minimum and maximum of
GI values for in each quintile. Panel B presents the percentage of deals, in which acquiring firm uses investment banks under each GI quintile group. Panel C
presents the association between market reaction CARs, use of investment banks and acquiring firm’s governance quality.
The F-tests on the right side of Panel C are the results of two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA). Still to use CAR (-1, 0) to illustrate, the first F-test with
value of 23.18 is testing the main effect of the use of investment banks. It has p value smaller than 0.0001, indicating the involvement of investment banks has
significant impact on the market reaction. The significance of F-test on the main effect of ‘GI’ confirms that governance quality is reflected in the market
reaction. The F-test on the interaction between the investment banks and governance quality has P-value of 3%, indicating that the banks and quality of
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governance work together and have impact on the market reaction. The ANOVA using CAR (-1, 1) presents similar results except that the interaction effect is
not significant at traditional significance level. The eyeballing observation indicates that when the poor governance, cooperated with investment banks, leads to
shareholders’ loss. The ANOVA analyses seemingly confirm the interaction effect.
The standard error is in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2. 3: Logistic regression analysis of the choice to use investment banks
Variables
Intercepts
GI
Log (Total Assets)
ROA

Use Bank
(1)
-2.5102***
(0.1677)
0.0199**
(0.008)
0.0978***
(0.0145)
-0.1948
(0.1716)

Relative size

Use Bank
(2)
-2.5885***
(0.1456)
0.0306***
(0.0070)
0.1663***
(0.0130)
0.0188
(0.1193)

Control years

Yes

3.2499***
(0.1605)
0.3008
(0.1923)
-0.095*
(0.056)
-0.061
(0.039)
0.1071
(0.2130)
0.5274***
(0.0496)
0.1231
(0.131)
-0.543***
(0.083)
0.4516***
(0.1070)
Yes

Obs
Pseudo R-square

10789
0.01

5411
0.215

Per20

1.1825***
(0.2415)

Stockpay
Industry
Attitude
Merger
Major
Partial
Remaining

This table shows the results of testing whether managerial power in the acquiring firm is associated with use of an
investment bank by estimating the following model

Prob( IB) = α + β 1 * GI + ∑ β i * Controls i + ε 1
Where IB is a binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm uses investment banks and 0 otherwise; GI is the governance
index for the acquiring firm as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), and it may be the exactly one year before the deal
announcement year or at most two year preceding deal announcement year; Controls include log (Total Asset), which is
the total asset of firms in the governance index dataset (in millions of dollars), ROA is return on asset of the acquiring
firm, and other control variables as follows:
Tranvalue is the deal value of transaction conducted by the acquiring firm; Relative size is the transaction value divided
by acquiring firm’s total asset; Per20 is the percentage of acquisitions that use investment banks in the twenty
acquisitions preceding the one specific acquisition; Stockpay is the percentage of deal value that is paid with acquiring
firm stocks; Industry is a dummy variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same industry or
diversification across different industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring firm and target
firm share first three digits of their main SIC, and 0 otherwise; Attitude is dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm
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opposes the deal and 0 otherwise; Merger is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the deal is merger and 0 otherwise;
Major is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring major interest in the target firm and 0
otherwise; Partial is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring partial interest in the target firm
and 0 otherwise; Remaining is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring remaining interest in the
target firm and 0 otherwise.
Model (1), (2) and (3) use the same sample, but have different model specifications. The GI dummy is coded to have
value of 1 when observation is on highest GI quintile and 0 otherwise.
The standard error is in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2. 4: The wealth effect of the interaction between investment banks and governance
quality in the acquiring firms
(1)
Intercepts
GI
IB

0.0157***
(0.0038)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0052***
(0.0013)

GI*IB

CAR(-1,0)
(2)
0.0172***
(0.0041)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0062
(0.0049)
-0.0007
(0.0005)
-0.0015***
(0.0003)

(3)
Self-selection
0.0215***
(0.0042)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0266***
(0.0093)
-0.0008*
(0.0004)
-0.0024***
(0.00047)

(4)
0.0272***
(0.0052)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0051***
(0.0017)

0.0290***
(0.0054)
-0.0002
(0.0028)
0.0103
(0.0065)
-0.0010*
(0.0006)
-0.0027***
(0.0005)

(6)
Self-selection
0.0331***
(0.0032)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0322***
(0.0123)
-0.0011*
(0.0006)
-0.0036***
(0.0006)

Log (Total
Asset)

-0.0014***
(0.0003)

ROA

-0.0038
(0.0046)

-0.0048
(0.0047)
-0.0091***
(0.0033)
-0.0068***
(0.0017)
0.0019*
(0.0012)
0.0032
(0.0052)
-0.0054***
(0.0015)
0.0029
(0.0043)
-0.0008
(0.0020)
0.0042
(0.0039)

-0.0047
(0.0046)
-0.0257***
(0.0056)
-0.0059***
(0.0017)
0.0022*
(0.0012)
0.0044
(0.0053)
-0.0086***
(0.0021)
0.0023
(0.0043)
0.0014
(0.0022)
0.0014
(0.0042)
-0.0111***
(0.0043)

0.0021
(0.0056)

0.0006
(0.0057)
-0.0107***
(0.0023)
-0.0086***
(0.0023)
0.0005
(0.0015)
0.0031
(0.0068)
-0.0073***
(0.0020)
0.0092
(0.0065)
-0.0038
(0.0024)
0.0050
(0.0047)

0.0009
(0.0057)
-0.0272***
(0.0079)
-0.0076***
(0.0023)
0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0062
(0.0067)
-0.0113***
(0.0027)
0.0085
(0.0065)
-0.0012
(0.0027)
0.0018
(0.0050)
-0.0127**
(0.0059)

Yes
10716
0.0081

Yes
5365
0.0269

Yes
5348
0.0280

Yes
10716
0.0090

Yes
5365
0.0282

Yes
5348
0.0278

Relative size
Stockpay
Industry
Attitude
Merger
Major
Partial
Remaining
Lambda (λ)
Control years
Obs.
Adj. R-square

-0.0026***
(0.0004)

CAR(-1,1)
(5)

This table shows the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the use of investment banks.

CAR = α + β1 * GI + β 2 * IB + β 3 * GI * IB + ∑ β i * Controlsi + ε 2
Where CAR is cumulative abnormal return over the window [-1, 0]; GI is the governance index for the acquiring firm as
in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), and it may be the exactly one year before the deal announcement year or at most
two year preceding deal announcement year; IB is a binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm uses investment banks
and 0 otherwise. Controls include ROA is return on asset of the acquiring firm, Log(Total Asset), which is the total asset
of firms in the governance index dataset (in millions of dollars), Relative size is the transaction value divided by acquiring
firm’s total asset, Stockpay is the percentage of deal value that is paid with acquiring firm stocks, Industry is a dummy
variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same industry or diversification across different
industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring firm and target firm share first three digits of their
main SIC, and 0 otherwise, Attitude is dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm opposes the deal and 0 otherwise;
Merger is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the deal is merger and 0 otherwise, Major is a dummy variable that
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takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring major interest in the target firm and 0 otherwise, Partial is a dummy variable
that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring partial interest in the target firm and 0 otherwise, and Remaining is a
dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the deal is acquiring remaining interest in the target firm and 0 otherwise.
In model (1), (2) and (3), CAR (-1, 0) is dependent variable. In model (4), (5) and (6), CAR (-1, 1) is dependent variable.
The White Heteroscedacity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE WEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF FAIRNESS
OPINIONS FOR ACQUIRING FIRMS’ SHAREHOLDERS
3.1. Introduction
In mergers and acquisitions, acquiring firms or target firms often seek a fairness opinion
from their financial advisors, usually investment banks, regarding whether the deal (particularly
the price to be paid) is fair to their shareholders. In the letter of opinion, investment banks
typically state that after having reviewed the deal, they think the deal as presented is fair to the
shareholders of the client firm from a financial point of view, assuming the information provided
by the firm is accurate.
Although the fairness opinion may have support from the chosen valuation model,
whether it has true value to shareholders remains a hot issue in the recent popular press (see
Leddy and Walters, 2005; Tack, 2005; Leone, 2006, among many others).

The National

Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) also stepped into the business and proposed Rule
2290, which places disclosure and procedural requirements on all NASD member broker-dealers
who provide fairness opinions.
Despite great attention from the popular media, there is little academic work
investigating what fairness opinions imply to shareholders of the acquiring firms that use them.
Recent work by Kisgen, Qian, and Song (2005) documents that acquirers that have two or more
fairness opinions have statistically positive long-term stock performance. However, the study
does not consider the self-selection issue in acquirers’ choice to use opinions for a deal, and
consequently, estimates of the impact of opinions from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions
can be biased. Our study investigates the value of fairness opinions by using the propensity score
matching method to address the self-selection issue. It explores two questions specifically: Does
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a merger stamped by “fairness” on the whole link to a good post-deal return to shareholders? If
not, why do firms spend millions of dollars on fairness opinions in the first place?
Inherently, a fairness opinion provides evidence that the board performs fiduciary duties
and includes the expert opinion of investment banks. In developing the fairness opinion,
investment banks review the deal plan, including its price, terms, and legality, and exercise their
expert judgment on whether the deal is fair to the shareholders. During the formation process of
the opinion, the board may be able to communicate with the opinion provider and increase
understanding of the proposal. Theoretically, this should lead to a reduction in information
asymmetry and help the board approve good deals. In addition, investment banks have expertise
and may have staked their reputation on the quality of their opinion. Their favorable opinion may
function as a “seal of approval.” Given these reasons, it is natural to expect opinioned mergers to
be good projects and in the interest of shareholders.
However, fairness opinions suffer from systematic problems, and this makes the accuracy
and value of the opinions suspicious. First, there are no objective standards regarding what
constitutes “fairness” from a financial point of view (Tack, 2005). Second, the primary motive
for obtaining a fairness opinion may not be to maximize shareholder wealth but to protect the
board itself.12 Third, the opinion may be tainted by a conflict of interest. Often, the opinion
providers also serve as financial advisors in the transaction and receive fees, the majority of
which are contingent on the successful completion of the deal. Negative opinions will jeopardize
completion of the deal and, therefore, the fee income (Tack, 2005; Leone, 2006).
Given the controversies about fairness opinions and the lack of rigid investigation on
what favorable opinions imply to shareholders, this study investigates the wealth implications of

12

The fairness opinion may function as an insurance policy to protect the board members in the event of a lawsuit
(Bowers and Latham III, 2004).
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opinions by focusing on the buy-side. I start with two hypotheses about why acquiring firms use
fairness opinions: the shareholder wealth and the board insurance hypotheses. Under the
shareholder wealth hypothesis, the acquiring firm’s shareholders benefit from fairness opinions
because the opinions help the board set a fair price and approve good mergers. Under the
insurance hypothesis, the board is more likely to buy a fairness opinion for a merger that is more
likely to be value-reducing, other things equal.
Since the acquiring firm self-selects to use an opinion, the estimate of the impact of the
fairness opinion on the wealth of the acquiring firm’s shareholders can be biased if the selfselection issue is not addressed. At the beginning of the investigation, I first compare the board
characteristics of acquiring firms that use opinions with those of acquiring firms that do not use
them; I find no difference in the characteristics. Then I apply the propensity score matching
method to identify a matching deal for each opinioned deal based on observable deal
characteristics. Using the pool of opinioned and non-opinioned matching deals, I investigate the
impact of fairness opinions.
Since there is no consensus regarding the standard of fairness, our study uses different
benchmarks to investigate the wealth implications of fairness opinions for shareholders. I
compare returns during the announcement period of opinioned and non-opinioned matching
mergers. In the long-run performance analysis, I compare the post-merger performance with the
pre-merger performance for the same acquiring firm, and I compare acquiring firms undertaking
opinioned or non-opinioned matching mergers with matching firms that do not undertake
mergers in the comparison period.
I find that firms with opinioned mergers receive more negative market reaction than those
with non-opinioned matching mergers during the announcement period. I find that in the longer
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time windows, firms with opinioned mergers perform more poorly than they did before the
mergers and underperform the matching firms over some window after the mergers, just as the
firms with non-opinioned matching mergers.
Overall, I conclude that fairness opinions do not have positive wealth implications for the
acquiring firm’s shareholders; the board purchasing the fairness opinion may simply be hedging
legal risk, and the mergers for which the board buys an opinion are not better deals compared
with non-opinioned ones.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops the hypotheses.
Section 3.3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results.
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.2. Development of hypotheses
3.2.1. Shareholder wealth hypothesis
The board’s oversight role has been extensively studied in the organizational literature
(see Miller, 2002). Through monitoring, the board can ameliorate the agency problems arising
from conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (see John and Senbet, 1998). The
literature specifically demonstrates that boards with higher proportions of outsiders can oversee
managers more effectively. Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) indicate that boards contribute to
the integrity of financial statements. Schellenger and Wood (1991) document that firms with a
greater percentage of outside directors have better returns than firms with a lower percentage of
outsider directors. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms with stronger outsider control of
the board have lower bond yields and higher ratings on their bond issue. Overall, the boards,
particularly the ones with strong outsider control, represent the interests of shareholders and
monitor management of the firm.
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In corporate mergers, managers usually develop the proposal and submit it to the board
for approval before shareholders vote. When reviewing the merger proposal, the board needs to
ensure that the merger is in the interests of shareholders. Since CEOs have the controlling power
over information and the directors may have limited access to the information required to fulfill
their role in monitoring and control (Nowak and McCabe, 2003), the board may obtain a fairness
opinion. In this case, the fairness opinion may help reduce information asymmetry and serve
shareholders’ interests. Thus, the shareholder wealth hypothesis suggests that fairness opinions
are valuable to shareholders.

3.2.2. Board insurance hypothesis
Boards of directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. When performing fiduciary
duties in mergers and acquisitions, directors need to inform themselves of all critical information
available prior to approving a merger. Directors can be held responsible for the actions they did
not take but should have taken. This was implied in the landmark Delaware case Smith vs. Van
Gorkom,13 in which the court imposed personal liability on outside directors because of gross
negligence in failing to determine a company’s value before selling the company.14 Obtaining a
fairness opinion evidences that the board is informed about its approval decision, and therefore,
it protects boards against possible lawsuits, functioning like an insurance policy.
Usually, corporations buy directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance. The insurance
policy covers the cost of directors and officers defending and settling lawsuits. Besides D&O

13

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
Though, in that case, the merger price was all cash at an almost 50 percent premium over the previous price of the
acquired company’s stock.

14
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liability insurance, directors also have the protection of two types of liability limitation statutes:
charter-option statutes and self-executing statutes.15
However, D&O liability insurance and other protections do not make it unnecessary to
use a fairness opinion. Although firms typically buy D&O liability insurance to protect directors
from personal liability, the policy has so many exclusions that they provide little coverage
(Doyle, 1991). In spite of the existence of the liability limitation provision under which directors
are not personally liable for negligence, lawsuits against directors can still damage their
reputation and their job opportunities in the directorship market. Thus, directors are usually
cautious and obtain as much insurance as possible.
Since directors’ and officers’ purchase of D&O liability insurance has valuation
implications, I expect that fairness opinions may also have similar valuation implications.
Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002) document that directors and officers purchase D&O
liability insurance at the time of their firm’s IPO to protect them from financial loss in
shareholder litigation. They find that the amount of D&O insurance purchased is negatively
associated with the three-year post-IPO stock performance. In the merger context, if the board
purchases the fairness opinion as an insurance policy, then the fairness opinion is similar to D&O
liability insurance in the IPO case. Therefore, the valuation implications should be similar:
mergers for which the board buys the opinion may be associated with poor future performance
compared with non-opinioned mergers.

15

Introduced by Delaware in July 1986 and subsequently adopted by at least 30 other states, charter-option statutes
allow a company to amend its charter to effectively eliminate directors’ liability to stockholders for monetary
damages arising from breach of fiduciary duty. Self-executing statutes are automatically applied in states such as
Indiana, Ohio, Florida, Wisconsin, and Maine, and shareholders’ approval for board protection is not required
(Brook and Rao, 1994).
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General insurance theories hold that either risk aversion or the likelihood that the project
will go wrong is one of the main factors driving the purchase of insurance. After I control for the
board’s risk preference, the likelihood that the project will go wrong is positively linked to the
purchase of insurance. Based on the arguments above, the insurance hypothesis states that the
board uses an opinion to protect the directors. Under this hypothesis, opinioned mergers are not
good investments if there is no difference in the risk preference of the board that uses opinions
and the board that does not.

3.2.3. Differentiating the two hypotheses
The shareholder wealth hypothesis holds that the board uses the opinion to make a
reasonable offer and possibly select a good merger that serves the interests of shareholders. The
insurance hypothesis holds that the board purchases the opinion for its self-protection. Under the
insurance hypothesis, purchase of opinion does not necessarily mean that the merger is not in
shareholders’ interests. If the opinion is accurate and helps the board approve good mergers,
shareholders will still benefit. If this is the case, it is not possible to differentiate the two
hypotheses. If, on the other hand, the opinion itself is not accurate, and favorable opinion is not
associated with superior returns, it is reasonable to conclude that the insurance hypothesis
supersedes the shareholder wealth hypothesis.

3.3. Data and methodology
3.3.1. Data sources
The merger deals are from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) on-line Merger and
Corporate Transactions database. When finding matching firms to construct long-run abnormal
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returns for the acquiring firms, I obtain book equity value from Compustat, and I obtain returns,
prices, and shares outstanding from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
From SDC, specifically I extract deals in the form of mergers between 1993 and 2003.
The total number of deals is 20,729. For these deals, I use the CUSIP numbers of the acquiring
firms and announcement dates of the deals to obtain the announcement returns and the long-run
abnormal returns using Eventus. This action gives us 3,299 mergers in which acquiring firms
were public firms. To obtain board characteristics of these acquiring firms and reduce the
workload of manually collecting/verifying fairness opinion information, I merge the corporate
director data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) with the data set of 3,299
observations produced above based on acquiring firm and announcement year. The manipulation
leaves us 1,213 deals occurring in the years between 1996 and 2003, the period covered by the
director data set. Then, I manually search SEC filings for the 580 deals among those 1,213 deals
that have information on financial advisors. I found 113 deals that use buy-side opinions.16
The deal characteristics are given in Table 3.1. The mean transaction value is $1.421
million; the mean total asset of the acquiring firm is $15.83 million; 48.8% of the deals are crossindustry mergers; only 1.8% of the deals are marked as “hostile”;17 in about 52.6% of the deals,
the acquiring firms more or less use their stock as currency; the average number of bidders is
1.046, indicating that there are multiple competing bidders in some deals; the average premium
that the target firm’s shareholders receive is about 54.35%; and abnormal returns of the acquiring
firms are 1.3% for the two-year period before the merger announcement.

16

The SDC reports that only 57 among these 1,213 deals used fairness opinions. In Kisgen, Qian, and Song (2006),
the percentage is 37%. They exclude the merger deals which have transaction value less then $5 milions. However,
the average transaction value in our sample in only $1.4 million (see table 1). In addition, the current study only
focues on merger deals and does not include other type of deals.
17
This low percentage is consistent with fact that I choose deals in the form of merger.
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3.3.2. Benchmark issue of performance measures
Since there is no clear basis against which to judge whether a transaction is substantively
fair from the shareholder’s standpoint, I use several benchmarks to measure the performance
associated with the mergers. I first employ event-study methodology to analyze announcement
period returns, and then I turn to long-run performance measures. In the long-run performance
analysis, I look at whether an acquiring firm’s shareholders are financially worse off due to the
merger and compare the performance of the same acquiring firm before and after the merger. I
also compare the acquiring firm with its matching firm that is not involved in a merger over the
comparison period. In the long-run analysis, I use different models for measuring the long-run
abnormal returns.
3.3.2.1. Event-study methodology: short-term analysis
Abnormal returns around merger announcements are computed using a normal eventstudy approach. The estimation period is the 255-day period ending 30 days prior to the
announcement date. The equally weighted index of stocks traded on the New York and
American Stock Exchanges are from the CRSP. Following Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman
(2001), I compute two-day (-1, 0) cumulative daily abnormal returns for acquirers at merger
announcements.
3.3.2.2. Long-run analyses: acquiring firm’s pre- and post-merger performance
Besides the announcement period returns, I also examine whether the fairness opinion is
informative about the long-run performance of the acquiring firm. In the long-run analysis, I first
compare the acquiring firm’s pre-merger performance to its post-merger performance. I employ
two different approaches to investigate this question. First, I define abnormal monthly returns
using the simple market model as in equation (3.1):
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(3.1)

where Rmt is an equally weighted market monthly return; Rijt is the monthly return of acquiring
firm i before or after the merger j; k is 12, 24, and 36 months; and SMARij captures the change in
average monthly abnormal returns around the merger.
Our second measure for the change in monthly abnormal returns is defined as in equation
(3.2):
FFARij = α +1 − α −1 ,

(3.2)

where α measures risk-adjusted abnormal returns and is the intercept from the four-factor model,
which includes Fama and French’s three factors (Fama and French, 1993) and the fourth
momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).18 Specifically, the model is given in equation (3.3):
Rijt − Rrft = α ij + bij ( Rm t − Rrft ) + s ij SMBt + hij HMLt + k ij Momentum t + ζ ijt ,

(3.3)

where Rijt is the monthly return of acquiring firm i; Rrft is the one-month Treasury bill rate; RmtRrft is the value-weight return on all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock
Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate;
SMBt is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big
portfolios; HMLt is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on
the two growth portfolios; Momentumt is the average return on the two high prior return
portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.
For each firm-merger, I estimate equation (3.3) using 12, 24, or 36 monthly returns
before and after the merger separately and obtain the two intercepts α +1 and α −1 . α +1 is the
18

All factors are taken from Kenneth R. French’s on-line data library:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html
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average abnormal monthly return after the merger. α −1 is the average abnormal monthly return
before the merger. The positive and negative subscripts denote post- and pre-merger,
respectively.
3.3.2.3. Long-run analyses: acquiring firms to matching firms
The second comparison basis is the size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-merger returns of
matching firms. Here, I adopt an approach similar to that of Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman
(2001). Specifically, I extract from CRSP all monthly returns, prices, and outstanding shares for
all firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1992 to 2003. Then, I obtain book
equity values (Compustat annual data item #60) for all firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ for the same time period.
I merge the monthly returns file with the book-equity-value file by exchange, ticker
symbol, and year.19 After merging these files, I take the following actions. First, I compute size,
book-to-market ratio, and prior 12-month buy-and-hold returns for each firm in each month.20
Second, I merge the sample of acquiring firms with the merged return and book-equity-value file
from the first action by exchange, year, month (one month before the announcement date for the
acquiring firm), and ticker (acquiring firm ticker in merger data). Acquiring firms with deal
information, size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-merger returns are separated out as the sample
file. Third, from the merged file I extract the firms that were not involved in a merger currently
or in the previous 36-month period. This file is the matching file, the pool of possible matching
firms. Finally, I merge the matching file and sample file by exchange, year, and month, and I
compute the sum of the absolute percentage differences of size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-

19

The monthly return, price, and number of outstanding shares for one stock are merged with the book equity value
in the previous year.
20
Size is market capitalization (measured as price per share times the number of shares outstanding on CRSP);
book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing the book equity value by market capitalization.
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merger 12-month returns between the acquiring firm and the possible matching firm for each
observation. 21 The firms from the matching file that have least, second, and third minimal
percentage sums are chosen as the number one, number two, and number three matching firms
for the sample firm.
Differing slightly from Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001), I match the firm using
the acquiring firm’s information one month before the announcement date instead of the
effective date. The intention is to alleviate the survivorship bias and capture the relatively
complete impact of the fairness opinion. If the effective date is used for the matching date, the
deals that are favorably opinioned but later withdrawn may not be included in the sample.
According to the literature (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999), the
matching firm approaches are considered less problematic and generally yield well-specified
testing statistics. Since cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are associated with fewer statistical
problems than long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), and BHARs imply an
implementable investment strategy, I calculate both to measure abnormal returns similar to
Barber and Lyon (1997).
The CAR for the sample firm s having a merger in calendar month d is calculated as
T

CAR sd = ∑ ( Rs ,t − Rsm ,t ) ,

(3.4)

t =1

where month t = 1 is the announcement month, the calendar month is d, Rst is the return on the
sample stock s on month t, Rsm is the return on control firm s,22 and T is the computing window

21

Choosing a matching firm in the same exchange and month has several advantages: first, firms with similar
characteristics, such as industry, size, and risk levels, tend to list on the same exchange/market (Corwin and Harris,
2001; Loughran, 1993). Second, the possible difference in market microstructure across different markets may affect
stock returns (Reinganum, 1990). Using a firm in the same exchange as the matching firm can maintain consistency
in measuring returns to a great extent.
22
For a given sample firm, its number one matching firm is first used as the control firm. If the number one firm is
de-listed before the sample firm, the number two firm is used from the de-list month of the number one firm; if the
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that is 12, 24, or 36 months from calendar month d. If the acquiring firm is de-listed before the
12, 24, or 36 months, T is the number of months from calendar month d to the de-list month.
Based on the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) approach, the abnormal return for
sample firm s having a merger in calendar month d is calculated as
⎡ T
⎤ ⎡ T
⎤
BHARsd = ⎢∏ (1 + Rs ,t ) − 1⎥ − ⎢∏ (1 + Rsm ,t ) − 1⎥ ,
⎣ t =1
⎦ ⎣ t =1
⎦

(3.5)

where the variables are defined as in equation (3.4).
Table 3.2 presents the performance measures for the acquiring firms. The announcement
returns over the two-day window (-1, 0) are -0.0079, significantly different from zero. The longrun performance measures, including cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy-and-hold
returns (BHAR), are negative and significant at the 1% level, and so are the changes in average
monthly abnormal returns under the simple market model (SMAR) and the Fama-French factor
model (FFAR). These non-positive returns associated with mergers presented in Table 1 are
consistent with previous studies (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992;
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Kohers and Kohers, 2001).

3.3.3. Self-selection and endogeneity issue of using fairness opinions
The firm makes the decision about whether to use a fairness opinion in the deal.
Estimates on whether fairness opinions add value will be biased without controlling for this selfselection issue. Here, I apply the propensity score matching method (PSM) to address this issue.
PSM is used to identify a comparison group that is statistically equivalent to the treated group
(opinioned deals in this study) in all respects except treatment status. It helps alleviate the bias
number two is de-listed again before the sample firm, the number three firm is used; if the number three is de-listed
before the sample firm, the market index is used. When the sample firm is de-listed before the 12, 24, or 36 months,
the sample firm is deleted from the sample from the month in which the firm is de-listed. In this case, T is the
number of months from calendar month d to the month in which the sample firm is de-listed.
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due to systematic differences between the treated and comparison group in the non-experimental
research setting (Blundell & Dias, 2000; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1984).
Under the PSM method, the treatment effect (the impact of fairness opinion here) is
defined as

τ * = E ( Perf1 − Perf 0 P( Z ))

(3.6)

where Perf1 is the performance of one acquiring firm after one opinioned deal, Perf0 is the
performance of another firm with a non-opinioned deal that matches the opinioned one, and P(Z)
is the propensity score, the predicted probability of using an opinion from the logit model based
on observable covariates Z; the non-opinioned matching and opinioned deals are matched by
their closest propensity scores.
By using this propensity score matching method, I can show that the features of the
matching deal and the opinioned deal are closely matched over multiple dimensions; then using
an opinion becomes a random behavior. In other words, the outcome of the opinion is
independent of the pre-opinion deal characteristics. Thus, estimates of the opinion’s impact will
be accurate with much less bias (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984).

3.4. Testing results
3.4.1. The comparison of board characteristics
Ex ante, a board that aligns its interest with its shareholders’ may be more likely to seek
opinions under the shareholder wealth hypothesis, and a board that is more risk averse will be
more likely to use opinions under the insurance hypothesis. To preliminarily differentiate these
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two hypotheses, I first compare the characteristics of the boards that use opinions and those that
do not.
The comparison focuses on board independence, equity holding, and risk preference. If
there is no difference in board independence or equity holding across the two groups, then I do
not have a good reason to believe that boards that obtain opinions represent their shareholders’
interests better than boards that do not use opinions. I have less confidence in inferring that the
boards that obtain opinions are more risk averse if there is no difference in boards’ risk
preference.23
I use several variables to measure the characteristics of the board: out is the percentage of
directors on the board who are outsiders. Outsider-dominated boards represent shareholders’
interests better (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Recent cases also show that outside directors are
often held liable.24 I expect the out variable to measure the independence of the board and the
influence of these cases. Boardholding is the aggregate percentage of the firm’s equity held by
board members. A high level of board equity may align the board’s interests with those of other
shareholders, reducing the conventional agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).25 Duality
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0
otherwise. I use this variable to capture the independence of the board. Age is the average age of
directors. The average age may be positively associated with the amount of wealth personally
accumulated by board members. The amount of wealth affects members’ risk attitude. 26

23

Measuring the risk attitude for a group is a challenging job. Here, I try our best to capture the possible differences
in boards’ risk preferences despite data limitations, such as a lack of information about directors’ wealth.
24
See the list of cases in Pastuszenski and Friedman-Boyce (2006). They include the following: in mid-2004, an
outside director of Emerging Communication, Inc. was personally held liable for approving an unfair price in a
going-private transaction; in January 2005, former outside directors of WorldCom and Enron paid $38 million of
their own money to settle claims.
25
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that Tobin’s Q first increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as
ownership by the board of directors rises.
26
Becker (2006) uses wealth to proxy for risk aversion.
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Delaware is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware, and 0
otherwise. The board of a firm incorporated in Delaware may be more cautious because of the
Smith v. Van Gorkom case (1985). Table 3.3 presents the results of the comparison.
Panel A presents the results of separate t-tests. Panel B shows the results of multivariate
variance analysis (MANOVA) with the F-value 1.26 and p-value 0.275027. None of the separate ttests or the MANOVA indicates a significant difference in board characteristics between
opinioned and non-opinioned firms. Thus, I do not have a reason to believe that there is a
difference in the board’s independence and its overall risk preference. The lack of difference
weakens the shareholder wealth hypothesis, since it seems there is no underlying reason to
believe that the board that uses opinions represents shareholders’ interests better. The lack of
difference also points to the direction of further testing. Since boards that use opinions are not
more risk averse, the only reason they still use opinions may be due to the characteristics of the
deal itself. The opinioned deal is more likely not to be a good investment under the insurance
hypothesis, since the board that uses opinions does not seem risk averse compared with the board
that does not use opinions. Given this reasoning, I focus on analyses of the deal features in the
next section.

3.4.2. The deal characteristics and determinants of use of fairness opinions
First, I conduct a univariate comparison of the deals using opinions with those not using
opinions. Table 3.4 gives the results. As I can see, there are symmetrical differences in the two
types of deals in several respects. The opinioned deals have significantly lower acquirers’ assets,

27

The different aspects of board structure balance and substitute for each other, and they are correlated based on the
theory of corporate governance (Pound, 1992). Therefore, to see the different aspects of board structure as a vector
and apply MANOVA to compare the differences of the characteristics of the vector is more appropriate than separate
t-tests. MANOVA also reduces the total type I errors that multiple T-tests may incur.
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higher transaction value, higher likelihood of using stocks as currency, and a lower premium.
Some of these aspects can be the reasons for or the outcome of using opinions. Kisgen, Qian, and
Song (2005) find that acquirers with top-tier advisors providing fairness opinions pay lower
premiums. The size of the acquirer and the transaction value are important determinants of using
opinions (Bowers and Latham III, 2006).
Under the insurance hypothesis, the probability that the deal will go wrong is positively
associated with opinion use, controlling for the board’s risk preference. If the insurance
hypothesis holds, I expect to see that the deal characteristics that negatively affect post-merger
performance will positively affect the use of opinions. To test this prediction, I run a logistic
regression to see which variables affect the likelihood of obtaining a fairness opinion, and I run
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to see which variables affect market reaction to the
merger. Table 3.5 gives the regression results.
Model (1) in the table is equation (3.6), a logistic regression with use of opinion as the
dependent variable. Model (2) is a simplified version of a logistic regression using actual
cumulative market returns as the proxy for the managerial expectation of the deal’s quality.
Models (1) and (2) examine the factors that affect the likelihood of obtaining a fairness opinion.
In model (1), the size of the transaction (tranvalue) is positively associated with obtaining a
fairness opinion. A possible explanation is that a large merger may be difficult to integrate and,
therefore, may have high risk. The stockpay variable has a coefficient estimate of 1.536,
significant at the 1% level. When stocks are used as currency, a fairness opinion is likely to be
used, perhaps because of the complexity of the valuation of stocks. Or it may be due to the
adverse effect of using stock as currency. When acquiring firms use stock as currency, it may
signal the market that their stocks are overvalued. Consequently, their stock price will go down
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and lead to shareholders’ loss after the announcement. Model (1) also shows that the coefficient
of the size of acquiring firms (asset) is -0.964, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the
size of acquiring firms is negatively associated with the likelihood of using a fairness opinion.
One plausible explanation may be that when the size of the acquiring firm increases, transaction
value becomes relatively smaller, and consequently, obtaining a fairness opinion becomes less
necessary.
Models (3) and (4) regress the cumulative daily abnormal returns during the
announcement period over the (-1, 0) window on the fairness opinion and other deal
characteristics. In model (4), both the size of the merger and the use of stock as currency are
negatively associated with market reaction. Model (4) clearly shows that even controlling for
deal characteristics, a fairness opinion is still associated with negative market reaction.28
Table 3.5 shows that the value of the transaction (tranvalue) and whether the acquiring
firm uses stock as currency (stockpay) negatively affect market reaction but positively affect the
likelihood of using an opinion. This is consistent with the insurance hypothesis: the greater the
likelihood that a deal will go wrong, resulting in a wealth loss for shareholders, the greater the
likelihood that the acquiring firm’s board will choose to use a fairness opinion. I use actual
cumulative abnormal returns to proxy for the managerial expectation of the deal’s quality in
model (2) and find that it is positively associated with the use of the opinions.
The wealth equations in Table 3.5 are straight OLS models without consideration of the
self-selection issue of using opinions. The coefficient estimates can be biased and misleading. In
the following section, I employ the propensity score matching method to address the selfselection issue and investigate the wealth implication of fairness opinion more rigorously.

28

I also use long-term performance measures as a dependent variable and find all coefficients of the fairness opinion
are negative but not significant at the traditional level.
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3.4.3. Self-selection issue: propensity score matching method and
matching deals
Table 3.5 shows investors seemingly do not treat opinions favorably. However, there may
be endogeneity in models (3) and (4). The expected negative returns are positively associated
with the use of opinions; the use of opinions is negatively associated with market reactions.
Moreover, as indicated in Table 3.4, the deals using opinions symmetrically differ from the deals
that do not use opinions at least in some respects. Both the bi-direction relation between using
opinions and (expected) market reaction and the self-selection issue bring out the endogeneity
issue of models (3) and (4) in Table 3.5. I need to address this issue to get unbiased (or at least
less biased) estimates on whether a fairness opinion does not add value.
I use the propensity score matching model to address this issue. Specifically, I run
logistic model (1) in Table 3.3 and keep the predicted probability for both opinioned and nonopinioned deals. Then for each opinioned deal, I find a non-opinioned deal that has the closest
value of predicted probability (propensity score for using opinions) as the matching deal. Thus, I
have 113 non-opinioned matching deals in total. The comparisons of matching and opinioned
deals are given in Table 3.6. As can be seen, there is no single significant t-test, indicating that
the matching deal is no different from the opinioned deal in any respect. Thus, the use of
opinions in the pool of opinioned and non-opinioned deals becomes a random event. From now
on, I investigate the wealth implications of fairness opinions based solely on these opinioned and
matching deals.

3.4.4. Univariate analyses based on the pool of opinioned and nonopinioned matching deals
4.4.4.1. Announcement period returns
Table 3.7 presents the two-day (-1, 0) cumulative daily abnormal returns.
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The table shows clear differences in announcement returns between the opinioned and nonopinioned firms. For the window (-1, 0), the mean cumulative announcement period return for
opinioned firms is -0.0393, which is significantly negative, with a t-statistic of -5.9805. However,
the mean cumulative announcement period return for firms that do not use opinions is -0.0161,
with a t-statistic of -2.9047. The difference between the firms that use opinions and those that do
not is significantly different from zero (mean difference is -0.0232 and t-statistic is -2.69).
4.4.4.2. Long-run analyses
a. Acquiring firm’s pre- and post-merger performance
Table 3.8 presents the average monthly abnormal returns for the acquiring firm before
and after the merger as well as the change in the average monthly abnormal returns.
Panel A of the table presents the results from the simple market model (SMAR). It shows
that in the 12 months after the merger, average monthly abnormal returns decrease by 0.0250 and
0.0132 for the opinioned and non-opinioned firms, respectively, both significant at the 1% level.
Similar patterns hold for the 24- and 36-month analyses. Both opinioned and non-opinioned
acquiring firms’ shareholders experience losses due to mergers. The t-statistic with the value of 1.34 shows that the difference in the decreases of average monthly abnormal returns over 12
months for opinioned and non-opinioned mergers is not significant in the simple market model,
indicating that opinioned mergers are not superior to non-opinioned mergers. The 24- and 36month analyses show similar results. Panel B in Table 3.8 shows results from the Fama-French
four-factor model (FFAR). It yields patterns similar to those in the simple market model.
Overall, Table 3.8 shows that shareholders of both opinioned and non-opinioned firms
experience significant decreases in average monthly abnormal returns in the 12, 24, and 36
months after the mergers compared to the 12, 24, and 36 months before the merger. This result
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holds for both the simple market model and the four-factor model. Thus, opinioned mergers are
not superior deals compared to non-opinioned mergers.
b. Acquiring firms to matching firms
For the long-run analysis, I also use the size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-merger return
matching firm as the second benchmark. Table 3.9 gives the results for this benchmark.
Panel A of Table 3.9 examines the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following
opinioned and non-opinioned mergers. The CARs for both groups are negative. Some of them are
significant at least at the 5% level. For instance, over the 12-month period, the mean CAR for
opinioned firms is -0.1076 and -0.0197 for non-opinioned firms. The t-statistics of the CARs, as
given in the T-test (1) column, are -2.5194 and -0.3333, respectively. The T-test (2) column gives
the t-statistics for the difference in CARs between opinioned and non-opinioned firms. The
difference in CARs is not significant; the t-value is -1.20 for 12 months, 0.28 for 24 months, and
0.50 for 36 months.
Panel B presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The BHARs for the opinioned
firms are negative for the 12-, 24-, and 36-month computing periods, but only over 12 months is
the BHAR significant at the 1% level for the opinioned deals. A direct comparison of the
difference in BHARs between opinioned and non-opinioned groups produces insignificant tstatistics. For instance, for the 12-month window, the t-value for the difference in BHARs
between the two groups is -0.98, which is not significant. A similar pattern of direct comparison
holds for the 24- and 36-month windows.
In summary, our long-run performance analyses show that both opinioned and nonopinioned acquiring firms perform worse compared to their own performance before the mergers,
and they perform worse than the matching firms over a 12-month window after the mergers.
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There is no evidence that opinioned mergers outperform non-opinioned mergers. In the short
announcement period, opinioned firms receive poorer market reaction than non-opinioned firms.
The findings are inconsistent with the shareholder wealth hypothesis. This implies that the
fairness opinion provided by investment banks may not be objective or accurate. The results are
consistent with the board insurance hypothesis: acquiring firms’ shareholders are not better off
because of the opinion, even though it costs them millions of dollars.

3.4.5. Multivariate analyses based on the pool of opinioned and nonopinioned matching deals
Table 3.10 presents the multivariate analyses. Consistent with the univariate analyses, the
buy-side opinion still has a negative impact on the two-day cumulative returns. The coefficient is
-0.028, significant at the 1% level. For the long-run performance measures, different windows
and measures give consistent results, and I illustrate the results using only 24-month windows.
The coefficient on the long-run performance equations are not significant, indicating that there is
no difference between opinioned and non-opinioned deals in the long run.

3.5. Conclusions
I find that acquiring firms with opinioned mergers have more negative announcement
returns than those firms with non-opinioned mergers. The results hold even when I address the
self-selection issue. In the long-term analysis, I find that compared to the performance before the
merger, the post-announcement performance of the acquiring firm is significantly worse,
regardless of whether acquiring firms obtain a fairness opinion. There is no evidence that the
opinioned acquiring firms lose less than non-opinioned firms. Also, in the long-run analysis, I
find that over some window acquiring firms that use opinions significantly underperform
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matching firms, just as non-opinioned acquiring firms do. The difference in long term abnormal
returns between opinioned acquiring firms and non-opinioned firms is not significant when
matching firms are used as a basis for comparison. In other words, compared to non-opinioned
mergers, the opinioned mergers are not superior investments.
The factors that negatively affect acquiring firms’ performance positively affect the use
of fairness opinions. The risk preference of boards that use opinions does not differ from that of
boards that do not. This implies that boards’ motive for buying the opinion may be to protect
board members against deals that cause wealth loss for shareholders, measured in short windows.
The results do not support the shareholder wealth hypothesis. The evidence is more
consistent with the board insurance hypothesis. It appears that the purpose of spending millions
of dollars on fairness opinions may be to protect the board against lawsuits. The implication for
investors becomes obvious: when analyzing the wealth consequence of a merger, more attention
should be given to the deal characteristics rather than to notarized documents such as fairness
opinions. Fairness opinions are more of an insurance policy for the board than an investment
vehicle for investors.
The results do not show that fairness opinions are accurate and value-enhancing for the
firm. One plausible interpretation may be related to the feature of the opinion market. Since there
are no coherent guidelines for fairness opinions, and opinion providers rely on managementprovided information, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of the opinion, and consequently, it is
difficult to discipline inaccurate opinion providers. Because of this difficulty, the disciplining
role of a provider’s reputation is significantly weakened. Recently formulated regulation requires
the opinion provider to disclose possible conflicts of interests in the deal. This may help the
market to better determine the value of the opinion. However, regularly disclosing the identity of
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the opinion provider and the post-merger performance of the acquiring firm that uses opinions
may help enhance self-discipline in the opinion market based on the reputation theory.
It should be noted that our results should be accepted in a limited way. First, our sample
consists only of mergers, and it focuses on buy-side fairness opinions of such deals. How
fairness opinions are associated with the opinion user’s performance in other scenarios is a
different question. For instance, the sell-side opinion may behave differently from the buy-side
opinion, since selling firms often disappear. Opinions for equity mergers may differ from
opinions for the purchase of assets, given the complexity of the deal. Therefore, to accurately
understand the results of this study, it is very important to recognize the scope of our sample.
Second, the fairness opinions I use in this study are all favorable ones and are disclosed on the
announcement date. There are negative opinions that may be right, but I are unable to identify
them, since they are not disclosed. Acquiring firms may selectively use opinions and disclose
only those that support their expansion strategies. Honorable investment banks doing fairness
opinion work sometimes turn down an opportunity to earn a fee on a particular fairness opinion
or resign from an assignment for their reputations’ sake. For instance, Merrill Lynch & Co.
declined to issue a final fairness opinion for Kansas City Power.29 In the future, it would be
interesting to look at the interactions between opinioned providers and acquirers during the
formation process of the opinions.
This study documents that in mergers, disclosed buy-side fairness opinions do not imply
good returns to shareholders on the whole; that is, favorable opinions by investment banks are
not favorable to the acquiring firms’ shareholders. Both the extant shareholders and potential
investors should be cautious when dealing with fairness opinions. This may be particularly
meaningful when the opinion provider has a conflict of interest in the deal.
29

January 4, 2000, The Wall Street Journal
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3.6. Tables for chapter three
Table 3. 1: Deal characteristics
Table 2.1 gives deal characteristics. asset is the dollar value of the acquiring firm’s total assets in deal
announcement year; pre-perf is the average abnormal monthly return of the acquiring firm against the simple market
model over 24 months before the merger announcement; tranvalue is the deal value of the transaction conducted by
the acquiring firm; Fai is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if acquiring firm uses fairness opinion and 0
otherwise; Industry is a dummy variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same industry
or diversification across different industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring firm and
target firm share the first three digits of their main SIC, and 0 otherwise; Attitude is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the target firm opposes the deal and 0 otherwise; stockpay is a dummy variable taking value 1 if acquiring firm uses
its stock as currency, and 0 otherwise; numbidders is the number of competitive bidders present before the result of
the deal is disclosed (completed or withdrawn); premium is price paid for each target share relative to the target’s
stock price 4 weeks before the announcement.
Variable
Asset
Ln(asset)
Pre-perf
Tranvalue
Ln(tranvalue)
Fai
Industry
Attitude
Stockpay
Numbidders
Premium

N

Mean
1176
1176
1213
1033
1033
1213
1213
1213
1213
1213
566

15830.98
8.099638
0.013567
1421.72
5.423514
0.0956
0.488046
0.018961
0.526793
1.046167
54.35327
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Std Deviation
54220.07
1.704214
0.030359
5079.25
1.923388
0.2942
0.500063
0.136444
0.499488
0.246116
101.2392

Minimum
14.3
2.66026
-0.0913
0.007
-4.96185
0
0
0
0
1
-86.28

Maximum
1057657
13.87157
0.194262
89167.72
11.39827
1
1
1
1
4
1937.04

Table 3. 2: Performance measures
This table presents the performance measures of the acquiring firm around the merger. CAR (-1,0) is the cumulative
abnormal return over a two-day window; SMAR is the simple market model abnormal return; FFAR is abnormal
return based on the four-factor model; CAR is long-run cumulative abnormal return against the matching firms;
BHAR is buy-and-hold abnormal return against the matching firms.
Variable
CAR(-1,0)

N
1213

Mean
-0.00796

Std Deviation
0.048517

Minimum
-0.27969

Maximum
0.178232

SMAR12
SMAR24
SMAR36

1213
1213
1213

-0.01536
-0.01612
-0.01674

0.059048
0.046124
0.034657

-0.35821
-0.24628
-0.19918

0.375106
0.368655
0.317711

FFAR12
FFAR24
FFAR36

1213
1213
1213

-0.01299
-0.00936
-0.0093

0.06702
0.038898
0.031041

-0.42613
-0.19528
-0.17683

0.374736
0.352051
0.298184

CAR12
CAR24
CAR36

1213
1213
1213

-0.04293
-0.07879
-0.10399

0.550085
0.69919
0.786569

-2.80596
-3.40107
-4.52015

3.278219
2.975789
3.42697

BHAR12
BHAR24
BHAR36

1213
1213
1213

-0.04269
-0.06408
-0.12132

0.804857
1.087306
1.578122

-7.79985
-10.6632
-33.6647

13.30247
10.49309
12.23722
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Table 3. 3: Comparison of risk characteristics between boards using opinion and those not
using opinions
This table compares the characteristics of boards that use opinions with those that do not. I use several variables to
measure the characteristics of the board: out is the percentage of directors on the board who are outsiders.
Boardholding is the aggregate percentage of shares held by board members. Duality is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. Age is the average age of directors.
Delaware is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware, and 0 otherwise.
The first part of the table shows the results of separate multiple T-tests, and the second part shows statistics for
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Board Feature

Group

Panel A: separate t-tests
Out
Opinioned

Boardholding

Duality

Age

Delaware

N
116

Not opinioned

1097

Opinioned

105

Not opinioned

1004

Opinioned

116

Not opinioned

1097

Opinioned

116

Not opinioned

1097

Opinioned

116

Not opinioned

1097

Mean

Difference

t-statistics
for Difference

0.636
(0.016)
0.628
(0.005)
6.254
(1.171)
7.999
(0.544)
0.819
(0.035)
0.842
(0.011)
57.733
(0.377)
58.303
(0.1278)
0.569
(0.046)
0.556
(0.015)

0.008
(0.017)

0.45

-1.745
(1.725)

1.35

-0.023
(0.035)

-1.12

-0.570
(0.411)

-1.08

0.012
(0.048)

1.00

Panel B: MANOVA test
F-value=1.26
P-value=0.2750
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Table 3. 4: The comparison of opinioned and non-opinioned deal characteristics
This table presents the results of two groups: opinioned and non-opinioned deals. The variables are as defined in
Table 1. The opinioned deals are significantly different from non-opinioned deals in multiple dimensions, including
the size of acquirer’s total assets, transaction value, premium, and whether using stocks as currency in the deal.
Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
t-statistics
Deal Feature
Group
N
Mean
Difference
for Difference
Asset
7088
-9680.9
-4.77***
Opinioned
114
(1040.3)
(5338.6)
16769
Non-opinioned
1062
(1744.9)
Ln(asset)
7.838
-0.289
-1.91*
Opinioned
114
(0.142)
(0.167)
8.1277
Non-opinioned
1062
(0.0528)
Pre-perf
0.017
0.004
Opinioned
116
1.30
(0.0026)
(0.003)
0.0132
Non-opinioned
1097
(0.0009)
Tranvalue
5162.5
4209
Opinioned
115
3.70***
(1132.4)
(485.28)
953.1
Non-opinioned
918
(97.49)
Ln(tranvalue)
7.271
2.079
Opinioned
115
11.62***
(0.1578)
(0.179)
5.192
Non-opinioned
918
(0.0602)
Industry
0.5086
0.023
Opinioned
116
0.47
(0.0466)
(0.0488)
0.4859
Non-opinioned
1097
(0.0151)
Attitude
0.0086
-0.011
Opinioned
116
-1.19
(0.0086)
(0.0133)
0.0201
Non-opinioned
1097
(0.0042)
Stockpay
0.9052
0.418
13.40***
Opinioned
116
(0.0273)
(0.0473)
0.4868
Non-opinioned
1097
(0.0151)
Numbidders
1.069
0.025
0.78
Opinioned
116
(0.0318)
(0.024)
1.0438
Non-opinioned
1097
(0.0071)
Premium
43.033
-13.377
-2.21**
Opinioned
87
(3.447)
(11.796)
56.409
Non-opinioned
479
(4.984)
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Table 3. 5: Determinants of using an opinion: board risk preference or deal characteristics,
and impact of the opinion on deal completion
This table shows that the factors that affect announcement period returns and factors that affect the likelihood of
using fairness opinions. Model (1) is equation (6) in the text, a logistic regression with use of opinion as the
dependent variable. Model (2) is a simplified version of a logistic regression using actual cumulative market returns
proxying for the managerial expectation of the deal’s quality. Models (3) and (4) are OLS regressions that regress
two-day (-1, 0) cumulative abnormal returns on the board and deal features, including whether the opinion is used.
Fai is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if acquiring firm uses fairness opinion and 0 otherwise; asset is the
dollar value of the acquiring firm’s total assets in deal announcement year; Pre-perf is the average abnormal
monthly return of the acquiring firm against the simple market model over 24 months before the merger
announcement; tranvalue is the deal value of the transaction conducted by the acquiring firm; Industry is a dummy
variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same industry or diversification across
different industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring firm and target firm share the first
three digits of their main SIC, and 0 otherwise; Attitude is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm opposes the
deal and 0 otherwise; stockpay is a dummy variable taking value 1 if acquiring firm uses its stock as currency, and 0
otherwise; numbidders is the number of competitive bidders present before the result of the deal is disclosed
(completed or withdrawn); Premium is price paid for each target share relative to the target’s stock price 4 weeks
before the announcement.
Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Logistic Model
Wealth equation car(-1,0)
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
Model (4)
Intercept
-2.360***
-2.479***
-0.004***
0.037**
(0.932)
(0.113)
(0.001)
(0.016)
CAR(-1,0)
-11.957***
(1.785)
Fai
-0.003***
-0.024***
(0.004)
(0.006)
Ln(asset)
-0.964***
0.001
(0.122)
(0.001)
0.024
Pre-perf.
-13.114***
(0.079)
(4.070)
Ln(tranvalue)
1.236***
-0.005***
(0.117)
(0.001)
Industry
-0.478*
-0.002
(0.255)
(0.004)
Attitude
-2.971***
0.011
(1.128)
(0.012)
Stockpay
1.536***
-0.010**
(0.382)
(0.004)
Numbidders
-0.218
-0.011
(0.413)
(0.006)
Premium
0.0000
(0.5525)
Control for year
Yes
No
No
Yes
N
1007
1213
1213
1213
Adj. R-sq
0.04
0.10
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Table 3. 6: The comparison of opinioned and non-opinioned matching deal characteristics
This table presents the results of two groups: opinioned and non-opinioned matching deals based on propensity
score matching method. The variables are as defined in Table 1. None of the t-statistics is significant, indicating that
there is no difference in opinioned and non-opinioned deals across multiple dimensions.
Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Deal Feature
Propensity

Ln(asset)

Pre-perf

Ln(tranvalue)

industry

Attitude

stock

Numbidders

Premium

Group

N

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Opinioned

85

Matching
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Mean

Difference

t-statistics
for Difference

0.4264
(0.0239)
0.4260
(0.0239)
7.8207
(0.1427)
7.8241
(0.1412)
0.0174
(0.0027)
0.0204
(0.0038)
7.2716
(0.1606)
7.3171
(0.1546)
0.5133
(0.0472)
0.5487
(0.047)
0.0088
(0.0088)
0.0000
(0.000)
0.9115
(0.0268)
0.9381
(0.0228)
1.0708
(0.0326)
1.0708
(0.0301)
44.16
(3.418)
44.60
(5.077)

0.0004
(0.0338)

0.01

-0.0034
(0.2008)

0.02

-0.003
(0.0046)

0.66

-0.0455
(0.223)

0.20

-0.0354
(0.0666)

-0.53

0.009
(0.008)

1.00

-0.0265
(0.0352)

-0.75

0.0000
(0.0443)

0.00

-0.434
(5.914)

0.07
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Table 3. 7: Comparison of announcement period returns
The table presents the comparison of announcement period cumulative daily abnormal returns over window (-1, 0)
between the acquiring firms that have opinioned mergers and those that have non-opinioned matching mergers. tstatistics for Mean tests whether the cumulative daily abnormal return is significant from zero. t-statistics for
Difference tests whether opinioned firms have worse cumulative daily abnormal returns than non-opinioned firms.
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Window
CAR(-1,0)

Group

N

Opinioned

113

Matching

113

Mean
-0.0393
(0.0065)
-0.0161
(0.0055)

63

t-statistics
for Mean

Difference

t-statistics
for Difference

-5.9805***

-0.0232
(0.0086)

-2.69***

-2.9047***

Table 3. 8: Using acquiring firm itself as benchmark, before- and after-merger comparison
This table presents a comparison of average monthly abnormal returns to acquiring firms before and after mergers. It
tabulates the decrease of average monthly abnormal returns due to mergers and the difference of such decreases
between opinioned and non-opinioned matching acquiring firm-deals. t-statistics for Difference tests whether the
difference in the decreases of average monthly abnormal returns before and after mergers is significant. SMAR is the
simple market model abnormal return and FFAR is Fama-French abnormal return. Standard errors appear in
parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Window Group

N

Before

After

Panel A: Simple market model abnormal return (SMAR)
12
Opinioned
113
0.0181*** -0.0070**
(0.0039)
(0.0037)
Matching
113
0.0171*** 0.0039
(0.0054)
(0.0007)
24
Opinioned
113
0.0173*** -0.0048**
(0.0026)
(0.0023)
Matching
113
0.0204*** -0.0001
(0.0037)
(0.0025)
36
Opinioned
113
0.0174*** -0.0038**
(0.0242)
(0.0018)
Matching
113
0.0239*** -0.0000
(0.0033)
(0.0018)
Panel B: Fama-French abnormal return (FFAR)
12
Opinioned
113
0.0231*** 0.0019
(0.0050)
(0.0039)
Matching
113
0.0377*** 0.0175***
(0.0055)
(0.0037)
24
Opinioned
113
0.0162*** 0.0043**
(0.0029)
(0.0020)
Matching
113
0.0252*** 0.0097***
(0.0036)
(0.0022)
36
Opinioned
113
0.0153*** 0.0030**
(0.0023)
(0.0014)
Matching
113
0.0230*** 0.0082***
(0.0032)
(0.0018)
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Decrease
-0.0250***
(0.0057)
-0.0132**
(0.0063)
-0.0222***
(0.0043)
-0.0204***
(0.0050)
-0.0212***
(0.0035)
-0.0240***
(0.0041)
-0.0212***
(0.0060)
-0.0201***
(0.0053)
-0.0119***
(0.0036)
-0.0155***
(0.0034)
-0.0123***
(0.0027)
-0.0147***
(0.0031)

Difference

t-statistics
for Difference

-0.0114
(0.0085)

-1.34

-0.0018
(0.0067)

-0.26

0.0030
(0.0054)

0.50

-0.0010
(0.0081)

-0.9

0.0040
(0.0050)

0.47

-0.0099
(0.0024)

-0.55

Table 3. 9: Using size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-merger performance matching firm
as benchmark
This table presents the abnormal returns to the acquiring firms with opinioned or non-opinioned matching mergers
relative to size, book-to-market ratio, and pre-merger performance matching firms that do not have mergers. It also
compares the abnormal returns between acquiring firms with opinioned mergers and those with non-opinioned
mergers. t-statistics for Mean tests the significance of abnormal returns. t-statistics for Difference tests whether
opinioned firms lose more than non-opinioned firms after the merger. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Window

Group

N

Mean

Panel A: Long-run cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
12
-0.1076
Opinioned
113
(0.0427)
-0.0197
Matching
113
(0.0593)
24
-0.0752
Opinioned
113
(0.0544)
-0.0998
Matching
113
(0.0690)
36
-0.0597
Opinioned
113
(0.0725)
-0.1148
Matching
113
(0.0831)
Panel B: Long-run buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)
12
-0.1350
Opinioned
113
(0.0491)
0.0116
Matching
113
(0.1407)
24
-0.0538
Opinioned
113
(0.0720)
-0.0849
Matching
113
(0.1026)
36
-0.3138
Opinioned
113
(0.3116)
-0.1643
Matching
113
(0.1378)
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t-statistics
for Mean

Difference

t-statistics
for Difference

-2.5194**

-0.0878
(0.0732)

-1.20

0.0250
(0.0879)

0.28

0.0550
(0.1103)

0.50

-0.1466
(0.1491)

-0.98

0.0310
(0.1254)

0.25

-0.1495
(0.3407)

-0.44

-0.3333
-1.3832
-1.4466
-0.8237
-1.3810
-2.7447***
-2.3989**
-0.7467
-0.8276
-1.0071
-1.1929

Table 3. 10: The wealth impact of buy-side fairness opinions: the results of multivariate
OLS regressions
This table presents the results of multivariate OLS regressions using the pool of opinioned and non-opinioned
matching deals. Dependent variables are two-day cumulative abnormal returns CAR (-1,0), the simple market
model abnormal return over a 24-month window (SMAR24), the abnormal return based on the four-factor model
over a 24-month window (FFAR24), the long-run cumulative abnormal return against the matching firms over a 24month window (CAR24), and the buy-and-hold abnormal return against the matching firms over a 24-month window
(BHAR24), respectively, in models (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5); Fai is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if acquiring
firm uses fairness opinion and 0 otherwise; asset is the dollar value of the acquiring firm’s total assets in deal
announcement year; Pre-perf is the average abnormal monthly return of the acquiring firm against the simple market
model over 24 months before the merger announcement; tranvalue is the deal value of the transaction conducted by
the acquiring firm; Industry is a dummy variable used to capture whether the deal is a simple expansion in the same
industry or diversification across different industries for the acquiring firm, and it assumes value 1 if the acquiring
firm and target firm share the first three digits of their main SIC, and 0 otherwise; Attitude is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the target firm opposes the deal and 0 otherwise; stockpay is a dummy variable taking value 1 if
acquiring firm uses its stock as currency, and 0 otherwise; numbidders is the number of competitive bidders present
before the result of the deal is disclosed (completed or withdrawn); Premium is price paid for each target share
relative to the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the announcement.
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Intercept
Fai
Ln(asset)
Pre-perf
Ln(tranvalue)
Industry
Attitude
Stockpay
Numbidders
Premium
Control for year
N
Adj. R-sq

Model (1)
CAR(-1,0)
0.025
(0.047)
-0.028***
(0.011)
0.006
(0.005)
0.087
(0.181)
-0.010**
(0.005)
0.013
(0.011)
0.031
(0.068)
-0.022
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.0150)
0.0001
(0.0001)
Yes
150
0.07

Model (2)
SMAR24
0.042***
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.003**
(0.001)
-1.367***
(0.059)
-0.0002
(0.0017)
-0.0035
(0.0036)
0.009
(0.022)
0.0058
(0.006)
0.0015
(0.0048)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
150
0.83

Model (3)
FFAR24
0.0228
(0.019)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.725***
(0.076)
0.0004
(0.0022)
-0.0056
(0.0047)
0.0447
(0.0286)
0.005
(0.0063)
-0.0061
(0.0063)
0.0000
(0.0000)
Yes
150
0.46
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Model (4)
CAR24
0.7799
(0.389)
0.032
(0.091)
-0.048
(0.047)
-4.684***
(1.499)
-0.0163
(0.0442)
0.0025
(0.092)
0.1555
(0.5616)
-0.0248
(0.160)
-0.248
(0.1239)
-0.0009
(0.0014)
Yes
150
0.08

Model (5)
BHAR24
1.130
(0.544)
0.0748
(0.1284)
-0.145**
(0.065)
-2.602
(2.098)
0.060
(0.061)
0.0493
(0.1293)
0.5511
(0.786)
-0.0620
(0.2246)
-0.307*
(0.173)
-2.602*
(2.098)
Yes
150
0.017
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL CONCLUSION
The dissertation examines the wealth impact of investment banks hired by acquiring
firms as financial advisors in their mergers and acquisitions. It does not address the issue on a
general basis. Instead, it takes unique perspectives. In the first part, the dissertation investigates
the impact of investment banks on acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth when the acquiring firm
has poor governance. The focus of this part is to look at how investment banks interact with the
requirements of acquiring firms’ managers. It finds that when the acquiring firms have poor
corporate governance, the use of investment banks is associated with value reduction for the
acquiring firms’ shareholders around the deal announcement. In the second part, the dissertation
investigates the wealth implication of fairness opinions that investment banks provide to the
acquiring firms regarding their merger deal. It finds that the opinioned deals do not associate
with less loss for the acquiring firms. In the short window, the acquiring firms which have
opinioned deals receive even worse market reaction than the firms which have non-opinioned
deals. The results indicate that the true reason that the acquiring firm’s board using opinions is to
hedge the legal risk.
The dissertation takes two unique perspectives and enriches our understanding to the
value of investment banks services in corporate mergers and acquisitions. It may be promising
for the further work to explore the value of other services provided by investment banks. Such
work can be helpful for us to accurately evaluate investment banks’ services in the economy.
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